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LAND AS A COMMODITY
"AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST"
Richard F. Babcock*
Duane A. Feurer**
We abuse land because we regard it
as a commodity belonging to us.'
Today there is a vigorous challenge to old assumptions concerning
the appropriate locus and nature of government control over land use.
Some of those in the vanguard of the attack on the old styles of land
use policy insist it is essential to cease regarding land as a commodity
to be bartered in the marketplace. 2 The suggestion that land should no
longer be treated as a commodity but rather regarded as a resource
has a compelling ring which appeals to many people in these days of a
heightened concern over environmental degradation.3
One hazard with this approach, however, is that it suggests that if
land is treated as a resource-a public trust-the perceived problems
in land use policy will be alleviated. The history in the United States
of the management of public lands, which are legally held in public
* A.B., 1940, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1946, M.B.A., 1950, University of Chi-
cago; partner in the law firm of Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago,
Illinois.
** B.A., 1964, Purdue University; J.D., 1967, University of Michigan; partner in
the law frm of Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Illinois.
This article is an elaboration of some suggestions made in a speech by one of the
authors at the annual meeting of the American Society of Planning Officials in Van-
couver, British Columbia, April 1975. That speech is printed in 41 PLANNING: THE
ASPO MAGAZINE 12 (1975).
1. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC vii (1949).
2. The report of the Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth chaired by
Laurance S. Rockefeller called for a new "land ethic" that regards land as a resource
rather than a commodity, a resource similar to air and water deserving of protection
against pollution. The Task Force report asserted that Americans "are rebelling against
the traditional processes of government and the marketplace which, they believe, have
inadequately guided development in the past." TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN
GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 7, 33 (W.
Reilly ed. 1973). The report of the Douglas Commission asserted that Americans are
"trustees" of their environment. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING
THE AMERICAN CITY 20 (1968).
3. For an early voice, see A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949).
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trust,4 does not indicate that pursuit of the public trust analogue as
applied to all land will lead to a result which will please the advocates
of the concept. Recent controversies such as the mining in Death
Valley National Monument,5 the Disney development at Mineral King
in the Sierras," the controversies over extensive clear-cutting and over-
cutting of national forests, 7 and innumerable other examples illustrate
that the government is carrying out its role as trustee of the public
lands with less than due regard for the public beneficiaries. There is
little to suggest that the influence of mining, lumber, grazing and other
interests seeking to exploit public lands is any less damaging to imple-
mentation of beneficent land use policies when exerted at a national
level than when exerted at the state or municipal level.
The more serious difficulty with such a pious sentiment as a
rallying point in a "revolution" (quiet or otherwise) in public policy is
that it may go further than is acceptable to most people or, indeed,
than is necessary to achieve the objective of a more rational land use
policy. It employs a rhetoric so sweeping as not to be taken seriously.
Those who urge such a posture rarely put forward useful methods for
transforming such a cry into a program of more than parochial scale.
It is our purpose to suggest that a land use policy which is socially
equitable and environmentally sensitive is not resolved simply by la-
belling land as a "resource" rather than a "commodity." Instead, we
propose to examine the special status land has enjoyed for many cen-
turies, and which distinguishes it from other commodities, and to sug-
gest that land transactions and land use should at last be scrutinized in
a manner not unlike the treatment extended to a multitude of other
commodities no more "affected with a public interest"8 than is land.
For centuries government has been more reluctant to regulate
4. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16. 28
(1940) (Congress is "in effect trustee of public lands for all the people"); Utah
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1916) ("in trust for all the
people"); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (the fact that Con-
gress holds Indian lands in trust does not take those lands outside the coverage of the
National Environmental Policy Act).
5. The Department of Interior is being sued to halt open-pit and strip-mining of
borates and talc within the Death Valley National Monument. Death Valley Nat'l
Monument v. Interior Dep't. No. 76-401 (N.D. Cal.. filed Feb. 26. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Commentary. Mineral
King Goes Downhill, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 555 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1975) (clear cutting). Concerning management practices of the United States Forest
Service in general. see G. RoBINsoN, THE FOREST SERVICE (1975).
8. See Part IV infra.
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transactions in land than it has transactions in personal property.
Even the modern use of the police power through zoning and subdivi-
sion regulations is less a matter of public regulation than it is a system
for granting private benefits or protecting private interests. We pro-
pose that the doctrines developed in the past century in public utility
law may be worth pursuing in the attempt to construct a rational land
use policy. There are at least four instances where such an analogy
may correct or mitigate current abuses or inequities: (1) scrutiny over
cost, profit, price and service, (2) the use of quotas and priorities, (3)
the limited protection against competition when it is in the public in-
terest, and (4) the power of condemnation by private developers upon
certification by a public agency.
Finally, we acknowledge the high risks in the use of analogy and
the difficulties of transferring doctrines applicable to transactions in
personal property to dealings in real estate. What follows, then, is
more a suggestion for a new way of viewing public regulation of trans-
actions in private land and the use of such land than a precise frame-
work for a new scheme of regulation. If this proposition offends envi-
ronmentalists and frightens developers, they should consider the
record extending over many centuries before they judge such an ap-
proach.
I.
Throughout Anglo-American history land, in contrast to other
commodities, has occupied a privileged status in society. "Land was
wealth, livelihood, family provision, and the principal subject-matter
of the law. To begin with, moreover, land was also government and
the structure of society."9 Land was the key to the power of the feudal
lord and ultimately of the sovereign. All land in England belonged to
the king who granted the various tenures to lower lords and peas-
ants.10 The king's absolute power over land, and his authority to levy
on land and seize it for non-payment led to the confrontation among
peers at Runnymede and the adoption in 1215 of the Magna Carta,
which contained protections against the seizure of property without
9. S. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 88 (1969).
10. See generally id. at 88-95; Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-In: Evolving Property
Concepts, 44 BOSTON U.L. REV. 435, 443-47 (1964).
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proper legal process.1 Although the English kings varied in the vigor
with which they honored the Magna Carta, by the time of the coloni-
zation of North America, rights in land had been secured against the
royal prerogative of seizure.' 2 It takes only a small stretch of the imag-
ination to view the current contest between municipalities and land-
owners over land use policy as a similar confrontation.
The feudal, pre-industrial focus on land as a source of wealth might
explain the special concern over the protection of that commodity, but
this status goes back so far that it transcends a feudal aberration.
Throughout history, chattel property has not enjoyed a similar status:
" [T] he ownership of land was a much more intense and completely
protected right than was the ownership of a chattel." 13 During the
Middle Ages, production of goods was often controlled by the guilds,
associations of producing craftsmen who controlled prices. 14 Various
elements of trade and commerce, including the wool trade' 5 and a
variety of commodities such as beer, bread, wine, and timber,16 were
subject to extensive regulation, including price regulation, as early as
the thirteenth century in England. But unlike trade in personal prop-
erty-a business of the rising middle-class merchants-land remained
the special prerogative of the sovereign and the nobility. In short, it
enjoyed a special class-oriented position.
The American Revolution arose out of a political conflict; it was
not a social upheaval. The united colonies did not intend to repeal
centuries of common law, including those privileges of land ownership
so relished by some leaders of the revolution. Indeed, the records of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 underscore the importance
attached to ownership of land: "Probably no member of the Conven-
tion believed that a government, republican in form, could be en-
trusted to men who were not qualified by the possession of real estate.
11. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
THE TAKING ISSUE 55-57 (1973).
12. Id. at 80.
13. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 153 (2d ed.
1898). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated:
"Land always has an owner.... In the language of the ancients, land was never re-
garded as res nullius." Scott v. Powell, 182 F.2d 75. 81 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The same
cannot be said for chattel property.
14. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 3 (1964); I J. GREEN,
TOWN LIFE IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 121-22 (1907).
15. J. GREEN, supra note 14, at 45-49.
16. II id., at 25-48.
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Property was considered to be the anchor of government.' 7 It is not
surprising, then, that from the earliest days of the republic, American
law has extended the privileges attached to the ownership of land,
leavened by the democratic notion that through acquisition of land a
nation of wanderers could be converted to responsible citizens.' 8
Although the long established exemption from execution and sale
for payment of debts of the homestead (the family home and a limited
amount of appurtenant land)' 9 has by now been extended to such items
as automobiles,20 and some jurisdictions limit the value of exempt real
property2' as well as personal property, other states that limit the
value of exempt personal property place no limitation on the value of
exempt real property.22 In addition, some states continue to provide
limited property tax exemptions with respect to occupied family resi-
17. I F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 464 (1901).
James Madison stated during the debates: "Viewing the subject in its merits alone,
the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty."
II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 203 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
The Constitution which finally evolved left the question of qualifications of electors up
to each state, some of which at that time did require land ownership as a qualification
for voting. Id. at 203-04; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
18. In 1796 the federal government sought to encourage the settlement of frontier
lands by offering land at auction at not less than $2.00 per acre in 640-acre tracts
with generous credit terms. The Land Act of 1796, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464 (1796) (current
version at 43 U.S.i. §§ 52, 751, 931 (1970)). Because such tracts were too large for
the typical debt-ridden migrant from the eastern states, the distribution system be-
came a playground for land speculators. See Shipley, A Summary History of Fed-
eral Land Policy, in G. LEFCOE, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAND LAW 13, 15
(1974). By 1820, legislation reduced the minimum acreage requirement to 80 acres
and the minimum price to $1.25 per acre. Act of Apr. 24, 1820, ch. 51, § 3, 3 Stat.
566 (1820) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 678 (1970)). In the following two dec-
ades, the amount of public land so claimed increased substantially. The Pre-emption
Act of 1841 and the Homestead Acts of 1862 and 1891 expanded the availability of
public lands by assuring any head of a household interested in cultivating land an
opportunity to acquire 160 acres of land at little monetary cost. See Preemption Act
of 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453 (1841); Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat.
392 (1862) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-63, 169, 171, 173, 175 (1970));
Homestead Act of 1891, ch. 561, §§ 4-6, 26 Stat. 1097 (1891) (current version
codified in scattered sections of 30, 43 U.S.C.).
19. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 175 (1970) ("No lands acquired under the provisions of
the homestead laws and laws supplemental and amendatory thereof shall in any
event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of
the patent therefor."); FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4 (1968, amended 1972). See generally
IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.15 (14th ed. 1976).
20. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 13 (1975); IowA CODE § 627.6 (1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2304 (Supp. 1975). See generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
6.14, 6.16.
21. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1975) (exempt real estate limited to
$10,000); IND. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-28-1 (Burns 1973) ($700); NEB. REV. STAT. §
40-101 (1974) ($4,000).
22. In FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(1) (1968, amended 1972), and KAN. CONST.
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dences.2 3 Mortgage moratoria were enacted to protect owners of real
property24 but no similar deferments were granted to ease the burdens
on debtors with respect to obligations on other types of property. 25
The Internal Revenue Code provides additional examples of the
special status of land ownership. When a homeowner sells a residence
at a profit and purchases a more expensive home, he can postpone
recognition of any capital gain realized on the sale.26 Land is the only
property which commonly benefits from this favorable tax treat-
ment.
2 7
The law governing landlord-tenant relationships contains illustra-
tions of the special treatment accorded by the law to land related mat-
ters. "Understanding of landlord-tenant law is best obtained by re-
flecting on what it is not. It is not similar to the law with which most
people are familiar. This is contract or sales law."'2 8 Courts in the past
have treated covenants in leases as independent. A landlord could
continue to collect rent even though he had breached covenants in a
lease. Even when a landlord had agreed in a lease to make repairs to
art. 15. § 9 limitations are placed only on the acreage, not the value of exempt real
property, whereas in FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(2) (1968, amended 1972), and KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2304 (Supp. 1975) much more stringent limitations are placed on
exempt personal property.
23. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.23-1 (1976) (providing a $1,500
homestead exemption with respect to real property taxes for persons over 65 years old).
24. "The primary object of these statutes is to preserve the properties in favor of
the owner in fee." Kaplan v. Rainisch Bros., Inc., 160 Misc. 685, 289 N.Y.S. 1 112.
1114 (Sup. Ct. 1936). See also Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398(1934). Similar protection for farmers is found in the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage
Act of 1934, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934), as amended, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942 (1935).
and ch. 39 §§ 1, 2, 54 Stat. 40 (1940), a portion of the Bankruptcy Act that provides
special arrangements to permit farmers to get on their feet financially before they lose
their farms to creditors.
25. An effort to bail out New York City through a three year moratorium on
enforcement of outstanding city debts was recently held unconstitutional by the New
York Court of Appeals. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp.. 40 N.Y.2d
731, 358 N.E.2d 848. 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
26. I.R.C. § 1034.
27. When stocks, diamonds, or antiques are sold, the government generally will
share in any profits in the year realized. See I.R.C. § 1002(c). Compare also the tax
benefits which can accrue to the landowner as opposed to the tenant who merely rents
a place to live. The landowner can deduct any real estate taxes paid on the property.
id. § 164, as well as the interest paid on the mortgage to finance the purchase. id. §
163. Meanwhile, the tenant of an apartment is without any tax benefit while the land-
lord gets the tax deductions for the interest and taxes covered by the tenant's rent.
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. Haynes, 330 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959) (owner's failure to
make repairs is no defense to a forcible detainer action even though lease contained
agreement to repair); Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938) (lessee
cannot refuse to pay rent because lessor breached agreement to repair unless the breach
constituted constructive eviction).
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leased premises, the failure to make such repairs did not absolve the
tenant from the obligation to pay rent.29 In contrast, a purchaser of
goods or services which are not delivered in accordance with the
terms of a contract can defend an action by the seller to recover the
purchase price by asserting a defense of recoupment pursuant to
which the purchaser's loss is off-set against the claim of the seller.30
The landlord's obligation to surrender quiet possession of the leased
premises to the tenant in return for rent was a different obligation
than the one to supply heat or hot water,31 and the landlord's failure
to provide such necessities did not absolve the tenant occupying the
premises of the obligation to pay rent.32
The law of landlord-tenant relations, however, is one area of real
property law where both judicial33 and statutory34 changes are pres-
ently being made to remedy many of the above inequities. Neverthe-
less, such changes have not been as widely or readily adopted as have
comparable remedies in connection with the sale of goods. 35
The special status of land appears in the application of the theory
of inverse condemnation. Government agencies that impose valid po-
lice power regulations on particular land are being challenged by
landowners who allege inverse condemnation for the diminution in
29. See, e.g., Welkner v. DiCarlo, 181 Md. 15, 27 A.2d 351 (1942) (buyer cannot
repudiate sales contract for seller's breach of agreement to service the goods, but may
set off the amount paid for repairs).
30. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1969) (em-
phasis in original).
31. Id.at231-39.
32. Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
33. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipi-
ent Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123 127-30 (1971).
34. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which has been adopted
in ten states to date, provides additional protections to tenants from landlords who
fail to live up to covenants in leases. UNIFORM LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 4.101-
.107. For comments and an analysis by the Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-
Tenant Act of the Committee on Leases of the American Bar Association's Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, see Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 104 (1973).
Other states have also enacted legislation giving tenants a limited right to withhold
rent or to make repairs and offset the cost against rent. See Developments in Contem-
porary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REV. 689,
740-41 (1973).
35. For example, the Uniform Sales Act, which was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1906 and adopted in 37
states, authorized a buyer of goods to keep goods which were delivered in breach of a
warranty and to diminish or extinguish the price due the seller. UNIFORM SALES ACT §
69(1)(a). The Uniform Commercial Code, which has replaced the Uniform Sales Act
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the value of their land by virtue of government regulations. 36 Courts
have found inverse condemnation even where the regulation has not
involved physical invasion by the government of the property of the
landowner. 37 There is no such analogue in government regulation of
commercial interests or personal property. 38 Although inverse con-
demnation rationally would seem to be as applicable to personal prop-
erty as to real property, we have found no instances of government
being forced to pay the owner of a business or other personal property
because of the exercise of valid government regulation. Government
control over real property may be stricken as a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process or for some other reason, but it appears that
government can regulate many businesses or commodities and dim-
inish their value substantially without payment to the owners for that
loss in value.39
Nothing demonstrates the chasm between the treatment of trade in
land from the trade in personal property more than a comparison of
the history of the regulation of the sale and trading in investment se-
and has been enacted in 49 states, provides that a buyer may deduct all or part of the
damages resulting from a breach of contract from any part of the price still due under
the contract. U.C.C. § 2-717.
The judiciary has also been slower to confront the problems of real property. For
example, the courts' assault upon sales of defective goods began as early as 1916 in
the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916), whereas Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
holding landlords bound to a warranty of habitability, was not decided until 1970.
36. See Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and
Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968
URB. L. ANN. I; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny. 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (the noise from
the airplanes using the county airport deprived a local property owner of the air ease-
ment over his property); Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp.
962 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (inverse condemnation award where city substituted "'Open
Space" zoning ordinance for its previous plan to acquire plaintiffs property through
eminent domain powers); Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959)
(executive order forbidding low-flying airplanes over a national forest deprived resort
owners of property, accessible only by airplane, for which they were entitled to com-
pensation); Charles v. Diamond, 47 App. Div. 2d 426, 366 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1975)
(property owner stated cause of action against village when state agency denied ap-
proval of sewer extension to his property because of village's failure to meet minimum
state standards); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 51 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal. Rptr.
547 (1976); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964) (inverse condemnation caused by low-flying airplanes).
38. "While inverse condemnation is usually associated with real property, an as
yet undeveloped concept may also include using it for personal property damage."
Feder & Wieland, Inverse Condemnation-A Viable Alternative, 51 DEN. L.J. 529,
549 (1974).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)
(upholding the validity of a War Production Board order closing gold mining opera-
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curities with the sale of land. Under federal law, as well as securities
laws in many states, the sale and trading of investment securities has
been subject to extensive regulation for more than forty years. 40
Although various states had become involved in some securities
matters earlier in our history, the first general securities law was
adopted in Kansas in 1911.41 The first comprehensive federal securi-
ties legislation was enacted in 1933 after the stock market crash of
1929.42 Brokers and dealers of securities are also regulated and must
meet specified qualifications. 43 Even "investment advisors" are regu-
lated. 4 The advertising materials used to offer securities to the public
must be filed with and approved by the securities regulatory agency. 45
The federal rules narrowly define the scope of permitted advertising of
securities offerings to provide some assurance the securities will not be
"puffed" without giving potential investors the necessary data to eval-
uate securities for themselves. Persons who control organizations that
have committed violations of the Securities Act may also be liable to
the same extent as the organizations actually committing the viola-
tions unless the controlling person can establish a lack of knowledge
or reasonable grounds to believe a violation had occurred.46 The Se-
curities Act extends to fraudulent interstate transactions in securities
.even though the securities involved may be exempt from registration
requirements of the Act.47 Furthermore, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 specifically authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commis-
tions during World War II). Perhaps the most extreme example of the authority of
government to regulate and even close a business without need to compensate owners
is in the area of intoxicating liquors, where states are vested with broad regulatory
powers under the 21st amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Califor-
nia v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401
(1938); Green Mountain Post No. I v. Liquor Control Bd., 117 Vt. 405, 94 A.2d 230
(1953).
40. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V
1975); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970 & Supp. V
1975); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 792-6 (1970
& Supp. V 1975); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1970 &
Supp. V 1975); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT. The latter act has been adopted or substan-
tially adopted with modifications in 32 states. I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4901.
41. I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 23-25, 27 (2d ed. 1961).
42. See id. at 120, 129.
43. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970 & Supp. V
1975); UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT 88 201, 204.
44. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-18a (1970 &
Supp. V 1975); UNIFORM SECURrEs ACT § 20 1(c).
45. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134-
.135a; UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 403.
46. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
47. Id. § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q.
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sion to promulgate such rules as it deems necessary to protect the
public against the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contriv-
ances in the sale of securities. 48
There has been substantial documentation of abuses in the subdivi-
sion and sale of land 49 but efforts to enact legislation to regulate land
sales in a manner comparable to the regulation of securities have
come up quite short.50 To a limited extent, the federal securities laws
as well as some state blue sky laws have been extended to cover sales
of interests in real estate, such as condominiums and subdivision lots,
where the particular objects of sale take on the character of tradi-
tional securities.51 Such interests are often sold to individuals who do
not propose to use the property for permanent residences but intend to
rent the property for income and often use the seller as an agent to
manage and rent the property. Where it is apparent that real estate
ventures purposely have been designed for sale primarily as invest-
ments rather than as residences, the securities regulation requirements
have been held applicable.52
Although securities have been regulated for half a century, it was
not until 1968 that Congress enacted the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act.5 3 That legislation, however, establishes a regulatory
mechanism much less pervasive than the federal securities laws. When
Congress finally did act, more than half the states had no legislation
regulating the sale of undeveloped land.5 4 Additional states have
adopted laws to regulate sale of subdivided land in recent years, but
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
49. See, e.g., M. PAULSON, THE GREAT LAND HUSTLE (1972); Finkler, What You
See Is What You Get, 38 PLANNING: THE ASPO MAGAZINE 202 (1972).
50. See Case & Jestor, Securities Regulations of Interstate Land Sales and Real
Estate Development-A Blue Sky Administrator's Viewpoint: Part I, 7 URB. LAW. 215
(1975).
51. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.401(t) (1969):
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1976); Release of Colorado Division of Securi-
ties, Nov. 6, 1970, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 9721; Ohio Securities Bulletin Octo-
ber 1973, 2 id. 38,759.
52. See, e.g., State v. Investors Security Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 209 N.W.2d 405
(1973); Florida Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 509 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1974). Similar in-
terpretations have also led to coverage of schemes to sell citrus groves. chinchillas, and
a variety of other items in addition to stocks and bonds. See, e.g., SEC v. W. J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160
P.2d 846 (1945). For a discussion of the coverage of the securities laws, see I L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION, 455-75 (1961).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
54. Case & Jester, Securities Regulation of Interstate Land Sales and Real Estate
Development-A Blue Sky Administrator's Viewpoint: Part II, 7 URB. LAW. 385. 417
(1975).
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there is still little uniformity. The Federal Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, in comparison with the federal securities laws, does
not contain any requirement for the registration or licensing of dealers
or salesmen, or provisions for the control of advertising materials used
in connection with the sale. Although a property report must be deliv-
ered to a purchaser,5 5 there is nothing to preclude the use of substan-
tial advertising prior to the registration of a subdivision to generate
interest. The Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment has authority to make and issue rules and regulations as
necessary to exercise the functions and powers conferred by the Act,
5 6
but this grant of authority is by no means the broad grant found in the
Securities Act for establishing rules to control the use of manipulative
or deceptive devices in the sale of securities. There are civil and crim-
inal penalties for violation of the Act,57 but the liability is not ex-
tended to "controlling persons" as in the case of the securities laws,
nor does the Act extend criminal or civil liability for the fraudulent
sales of property sold pursuant to an exemption from the Act's regis-
tration requirements. Many states do require licensing or registration
of real estate dealers, but it is stretching the imagination to suggest
that the regulation of real estate dealers is as extensive as are the regu-
lation and supervision of securities dealers under federal securities
laws.
In short, reform in the public surveillance of transactions in land
has lagged far behind the public supervision of the markets in per-
sonal property.
II.
Although we have suggested that land has occupied a rather special
status, enjoying special privileges and exempt from much of the kind
of regulation that is imposed on other businesses and personal prop-
erty, it cannot, of course, be contended that land is not subject to reg-
ulation. The host of land use and environmental controls implemented
and administered by all levels of government do affect the use to
which particular land may be put and how that use may be carried
out.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1970).
56. Id.§ 1718.
57. Id. §§ 1709, 1717.
299
Washington Law Review
Zoning, the traditional American legal mechanism for control of
land use, is not a system of public regulation in the same sense as se-
curities laws or public utility laws. Zoning policy and practice today
reflect a contest between competing private interests in real estate: the
developer versus the protesting property owners or neighbors. In zon-
ing, the invitation to individuals to seek changes is a major feature of
the law. Amendments, variances, conditional uses, planned unit devel-
opments all reflect the probability of change at the behest of some in-
dividual or group of individuals. Of the more than 10,000 reported
decisions on American land use controls since Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,5 8 substantially all of them arose because a zoning change
was denied or because it was granted. 59 Although one party to the
lawsuit is often a municipality, it usually is a surrogate for the real
parties of interest-property owners who propose a change or object
to a proposed change. Zoning has been constructed through the bal-
ancing of private interests, either in the courts or in political forums.60
The landowner/developer who protests what he regards as an uncon-
scionable public restraint on his property rights is really protesting the
benefits that restraint grants to other owners of private property who
resist his proposal. The often outrageous municipal practices that dis-
courage or prevent development are essentially designed and intended
to further the interests of one group of landowners, those who are
aboard, against another group, those who want to sell their land to
others who wish to come aboard. Indeed, the strong and generally
successful opposition of local governments to efforts to establish a
state-wide land use regulatory policy suggests that a zoning ordinance
is frequently viewed more as the bylaws of a private club than it is as
a statement of public policy. 61
Beyond this special characteristic of zoning which rebuts its alleged
"public" regulatory feature, neither zoning nor any other system of
regulation exists which provides a comprehensive oversight of transac-
tions in land similar to that found with respect to securities as well as
other commodities and services deemed to be affected with a public
58. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
59. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 3.01 (1974).
60. In Justice Stevens' dissent in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc..
96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976), he distinguishes between those zoning cases concerning matters
that affect the general public interest in a municipality's basic zoning plan and those
instances where private interests predominate and there is no threat to the general
community-wide plan.
61. Babcock, The Deplorable States, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Sept./Oct. 1976. at 23.
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interest. It is, for example, the declared national policy that a goal is
"a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family, '62 but most of the regulatory mechanisms applicable to land
use do not provide any assurance that people in need of land or struc-
tures on land will be able to fulfill those needs at a reasonable cost.
Indeed, more often land use and environmental regulations havc
forced the costs of housing and land to a point where many people are
priced out of the market.63
The kind and intensity of land development is, of course, regulated
by government through regulatory programs such as building and
housing codes and environmental controls, all of which affect the kind
and quality of activities or development that may take place on land
and, indirectly, the profits that may. be obtained. Builders may be re-
quired to put in streets, sewers, curbs, sidewalks and a variety of other
publicly imposed standards relating to the use and development of
land.
Although such controls are ubiquitous, they do not impose on the
vendor of land the same measure of oversight as is found, for exam-
ple, in public utility law. Building or housing codes come into play
only when a vendor elects to build a particular structure. Minimum
requirements in terms of strength of building materials, use of elec-
trical conduit rather than open wiring, plumbing and other specifica-
tions, room size, sanitation, and a variety of other requirements will
significantly limit the builders choice of materials and manner of con-
struction. Such codes, however, do not insure a consistency in the
design, availability and quality of construction. There may be sub-
stantial variation in codes from one local jurisdiction to the next. In
addition, they often contain unnecessarily high standards and are un-
evenly administered and enforced. 64 Furthermore, these codes provide
little assurance that a building constructed in compliance with code re-
quirements will maintain its standards after final inspection.6 5
62. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
63. See, e.g., Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
39-40 (1971).
64. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BUILDING
CODES: A PROGRAM FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 81 (1966).
65. The National Association of Home Builders is concerned with the problem of
housing defects not protected by public law, and has endorsed a voluntary Home
Owners Warranty Program to give protection to purchasers of new homes over a ten-
year period. See Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program: An Initial Analysis; 28
STAN. L. REV. 357 (1976); NAHB's Home Warranty Plan---Where and How it Works,
THE BUILDING OFFICIAL AND CODE ADMINISTRATOR, May 1975, at 30.
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In contrast, public utilities that merchandise a service or personal
property are subject to continuous oversight by regulatory agencies to
assure a consistently high level of service. Utilities are not permitted to
provide only that type of service they elect to provide, because regula-
tory agencies may require them to provide particular kinds of services
deemed to be in the public interest.16 These agencies also adopt rules
and regulations concerning the quality of service provided by utili-
ties6 7 and utilities are subject to monitoring and surveillance to assure
that service quality standards are met on a continuing basis. 68
Environmental regulation may significantly affect land use.6 9 When
streams and lakes are polluted or sewage treatment capacity is over-
loaded, new industrial or residential construction may be precluded
because there will be no place to dump wastes.7 0 The current contro-
versy in the United States Congress concerning amendments to the
Clean Air Act to deal with the deterioration of air quality in areas
66. One example is the order of the Federal Communications Commission requir-
ing telephone companies to permit customers to own certain pieces of telephone equip-
ment and attach them directly to the telephone network without the protective devices
previously required by telephone companies. In re Proposals for new or revised classes
of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Tele-
phone Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975).
Mandatory dedication of land or facilities (or payments in lieu thereof) may become
more common in land use regulation through the exercise of subdivision and planned
unit development controls. E.g., Associated Home Builders. Inc. v. Walnut Creek.
4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Jerad, Inc. v. Village of Scars-
dale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). Such exactions, how-
ever, do not impose a continuing obligation on the part of the traders in land once
the land is developed and sold.
67. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm'n. Rule 10, General Order 24, Revised (1975)
(specifying minimum water pressure in customer's water service connections); id. §
601-10, General Order 197 (1970) (specifying standards of quality for telephone
service).
68. Under the typical system of property taxation, landowners have an incentive to
let the quality of housing deteriorate because any improvements may subject the owner
to an increase in taxes. G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 220-25 (1969).
SENATE COMM. ON GOVT OPERATIONS, 92D CONG., IST SESS., PROPERTY TAXATION:
EFFECTS ON LAND USE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES 24-27 (Comm. Print 197 1).
In contrast, public utilities have an incentive to make investments in new land and
improvements that will increase the rate base upon which a utility is permitted to earn
a return through rates charged to customers. See P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC
UTILITY ECONOMICS 56 (1964).
69. For an excellent study of the impact of environmental regulation, see F. Bossel-
man, D. Feurer & D. Callies, EPA Authority Affecting Land Use (March 12, 1974)
(prepared for Office of Planning and Evaluation of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency).
70. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h)
(Supp. V 1975). That act permits state environmental agencies or the federal EPA to
sue a municipality to bar further hookups of new sources of pollution to municipal
sewage treatment plants where the plants do not meet appropriate pollution standards.
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where air meets national ambient air quality standards71 will, if seri-
ously enforced, influence the shape of future development throughout
the country. Pollution control programs, however, are not designed
for the purpose of controlling the use and development of land. Land
use controls may be a means to an end in pollution control programs,
but the end is clean air, clean water, or freedom from excessive noise
and pesticides. Pollution control programs do not provide oversight
concerning the type, quantity, and quality of land use activities unless
those activities will interfere with the attainment of pollution control
objectives.
Other environmental programs such as wetlands,72 shorelands,7 3
critical areas,74 and wild river programs75 seek to provide a more per-
vasive and positive set of land use controls in the name of preserving
the special natural features of particular geographic areas. Develop-
ment along San Francisco Bay is controlled by the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission;76 efforts are being made
to preserve the deep blue of Lake Tahoe through a bistate compact
agency, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency;77 public and private
land alike are subject to controls by the Adirondack Park Agency in
overseeing development in a 6,000,000 acre park in upstate New
York.78 These and other similar programs are all characterized by
their limited application to particular geographic areas which have
been identified as having a very special significance to citizens of a
particular jurisdiction. They are also notable by their focus on every-
thing but housing needs.
71. In Sierra Club. v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 4 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S.- 541 (1973), the Environmental
Protection Agency was held responsible by the court to assure that state air quality
implementation plans required by the Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5
(1970 & Supp. V 1975), do not permit significant deterioration of existing air quality
in those places where air is cleaner than specified in national ambient air quality
standards.
72. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 131, §§ 40, 40A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972 &
Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 62.1-13.1 et seq. (1973). The Massachusetts Wetland Pro-
tection Program is described in F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION
IN LAND USE CONTROL 205-34 (197 1).
73. See, e.g., Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58
(1976).
74. See, e.g., The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of
1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 380 (West 1974).
75. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 10-167 et seq. (1973).
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66600 et seq. (West 1969 & Supp. 1975).
77. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).
78. Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 800 et seq. (McKinney Supp.
1975-76).
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Although land is subject to regulation that may affect the quality,
quantity, and costs of development on particular land, real estate by
and large retains its "special status." The principal means of land use
regulation are fractured municipal regulations which are imposed as a
result of superior persuasion by other landowners. The sale or trading
in land is relatively immune from regulation, and unlike regulation of
other commodities, land use policy shows little concern for a broad
social interest.
A more fruitful approach to public policy on land would begin with
an appreciation of the arcane ways in which the ownership of land has
been annointed; ways which no longer deserve the protection not ex-
tended to ownership of, and transactions in, personal property. If the
mystique of ten centuries of the development of real property law
could be put aside, land regulation might be dealt with on a more
pragmatic basis reflective of and complimentary to existing economic,
social, and environmental public policies. The timeliness of such a
reappraisal is suggested by the current restlessness about land use
policy as we have known it for half a century.
III.
The development of a land use policy is, as Professor Norman Wil-
liams has suggested, at a "Y" fork.79 Fifty years ago the states dele-
gated direct and overt controls over private land use to municipalities
by means of zoning and subdivision regulations. More recently, less
obvious but equally influential control has been exercised by state and
federal agencies in such areas as the underwriting of mortgage insur-
ance,80 highway programs, 8' and environmental regulations. 82 Which
stratum of public control will emerge victorious is unknown.
In the past decade both of these levels of power have been chal-
lenged. The municipal dominance of overt controls has been subject
to widespread criticism. 83 At the other level, the FHA has been ac-
79. 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 59. § 5.06.
80. See National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1970); M. CLAWSON.
SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 41-42 (1971).
81. See Federal Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970). See generally I N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 59, § 1.16.
82. See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra.
83. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 53-54 (1966); MODEL LAND DEVEL-
OPMENT CODE, art. 7, Comment (American Law Institute); Sager. Tight Little Islands:
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
304
Vol. 52: 289, 1977
Land Regulation
cused of initiating "redlining" and subsidizing the white ring around
our central cities;84 the highway lobby has discovered that the little
old ladies in tennis shoes are a force to be reckoned with, from Fran-
conia Notch in New Hampshire,85 through Overton Park in Mem-
phis,86 to the Halawa and Moanalua Valleys in Hawaii,87 and the en-
vironmentalists have been accused of everything from elitism to rac-
ism.88
Those concerned with the economics of land transactions are also
restless. They suggest it is necessary to find new methods to determine
a fair level of expectation from investment in land. Land values often
fluctuate substantially because of activities of government in granting
favorable zoning, building highways, extending water and sewer
mains, or any of a multitude of other factors. The landholder affected
by such activities can reap enormous profits simply by having the
good fortune to own land in the right place at the right time. Pro-
posals have been made for ways to "recapture" some of the value
added to land by public activity.8 9 The chief of the United States
Department of Transportation's Urban Mass Transportation Adminis-
tration 90 and the administrator of the Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency9' have both urged development of programs to permit
84. See, e.g., Duncan, Hood & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and
Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW.
510, 511 (1975). Congress has reacted to charges and findings of'redlining by enacting
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 302, 89 Stat. 1125
(1975).
85. Society for Protection of N.H. Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H.
1975) (construction of freeway enjoined pending completion of impact statement
where construction would require enlargement of park road).
86. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (Secretary
of Transportation must show what factors he considered and how the decision was
made to disburse federal funds for highway through public park where statute required
showing that no "feasible and prudent" alternate route existed).
87. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Hawaii 1974), rev'd, 533
F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976) (construction of highway enjoined until the Secretary of
Transportation made determination required by statute of alternate routes, minimizing
harm).
88. For a collection of the criticisms, see R. BABCOCK & D. CALLIES, ECOLOGY AND
HOUSING: VIRTUES IN CONFLICT, IN MODERNIZING URBAN LAND POLICY, RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE 205 (M. Clawson ed. 1973).
89. Callies & Duerksen, Value Recapture as a Source of Funds to Finance Public
Projects, 8 URB. L. ANN. 73 (1974); Rice Center for Community Design & Research
(Nov. 1974) (prepared for U.S. Dep't Transportation, Office of University Related
Research).
90. Remarks of R. E. Patricelli, 3 LAND AND THE ENVIRONMENT 172 (bi-weekly ed.
1975) (published by Business Publishers, Inc.).
91. Remarks of R. E. Train, id. at 180.
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public agencies to realize more fully the incremental values created by
public expenditures. Of course, the effect of public activity on land
value is not always to produce a windfall to the landowner. The oppo-
site may also happen.92
Most of the criticism of current land use policy is directed at the
American system that delegates land use control to the myriad of
municipal governments which jealously seek to protect their sovereign
power to control what happens to land within their own haphazard
boundaries. The character of many American suburbs has been attrib-
uted, in large part, to the use of local land use controls to exclude "un-
desirable" types of development. Through such devices as large lot
zoning, density controls, minimum floor area requirements, and other
substantive controls, not to mention a Byzantine system of administra-
tive procedures, the cost and type of housing in many suburban areas
has been controlled in such a manner that only the expensive single
family or multiple dwellings are feasible. Thus, many persons with
low incomes, particularly racial minorities, are prevented from "pol-
luting" the suburbs. 93 A look at some of the cases that crowd state and
federal courts provides evidence of the continuing concern, at least in
the state courts, for exclusionary zoning. 94 Some state legislatures in
92. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts: A Preliminary Report, in I MANAGEMENT
AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 275 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
93. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING-LAND USE REGULATION
AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's 5-17 (1973); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS,
supra note 2 at 211-17.
94. Contrast the responses of federal courts that have rebuffed efforts to break
down apparent exclusionary land use policies with the responses from state courts that
have been more forceful in overturning local efforts thought to be exclusionary. The
federal cases are: City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358
(1976) (authorizing use of voter referendum before land use changes are authorized);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (challenge to zoning ordinance as discriminatory
toward low and moderate income groups dismissed for lack of standing); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding an ordinance restricting land use
to single family residences and defining "family" to exclude more than two unrelated
persons in a single residential unit); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organiza-
tion v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) (denial of injunction direct-
ing implementation of a zoning change permitting federally financed housing project.
which had been nullified by a voter referendum). See also Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977) (upholding refusal to
grant zoning change to permit multi-family units for low and moderate income per-
sons).
The state court cases are: Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (restrictions requiring single family resi-
dences and large lots were violations of the New Jersey constitution's equal protection
and due process clauses); National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597, 612 (1965) ("A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the en-
trance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon
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the early years of this decade directed the establishment of programs
pursuant to which state agencies are exercising an increasing influence
and even direct control over important aspects of land use planning
and control.95
The paradox is that while some state legislatures and some state
courts are questioning municipal domination, imaginative municipal
governments are implementing initiatives to control more firmly the
development of land within their jurisdictions. Such plans are re-
ceiving favorable acceptance by the courts, although scrutinized to
prevent racial and economic discrimination. 96 Timed development
ordinances,97 moratoria on building permits, 98 controls to limit
second home development, 99 historic preservation designations, 100
charter amendments to put a cap on total permissible dwelling units
within a municipality,1 ' and other municipal control efforts going
the administration of public services and facilities can not be held valid"); Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975)
(". . . in enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional needs
and requirements"); Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City
of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (the con-
stitutionality of restrictions significantly affecting residents of surrounding communi-
ties must be measured by the impact upon the welfare of the surrounding
region, not merely the impact on the welfare of the enacting community). See also
Babcock, On the Choice of Forum, 27 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 7 (No. 6,
1975); Urban Land Institute Research Report 23, Fair Housing and Exclusionary
Land Use (1974) (a summary of cases challenging exclusionary land use practices).
95. Fred Bosselman and David Callies documented this "quiet revolution" in their
report prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality in 1971. F. BOSSELMAN &
D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). The "revolution,"
today more quiescent than quiet, was sef back by the failure of Congress to pass na-
tional land use legislation. See, e.g., Florida Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act of 1972, 14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 308 et seq. (West 1973); Florida Local Gov-
ernment Comprehensive Planning Act, id. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (requiring local govern-
ment to adopt comprehensive plans after review of proposed plans by state); Oregon
Land Use Law, ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 80 (1973).
96. See, e.g., cases cited in note 94 supra.
97. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). But see Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975). In Board of Super-
visors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975), the Virginia Supreme Court re-
fused to uphold county efforts to influence the timing of development where it found
public facilities were or would be available to serve the land in question.
98. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
99. See Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
100. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975);
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 131, 235 So.2d 402 (1970); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975). See also
Gerstell, Needed: A Landmark Decision, 8 URB. LAW. 213 (1976).
101. The Boca Raton "housing cap" was declared unconstitutional in a decision of
the trial court in Boca-Villas Corp. v. E. E. Pence, No. 73-106 CA (L) 01 F, Cir. Ct.
of the 15th Jud. Dist., Fla. (Sept. 30, 1976). Although overturning the cap, and finding
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beyond traditional zoning and subdivision programs have received
judicial approval.
The disquiet over the present system does not only result from the
struggle between those who seek to substitute regional control for
municipal power and those who would invent ingenious techniques to
maintain local control. The unrest is also apparent in the increasing
demands that, in the larger cities at least, community organizations be
given a greater voice in land use policies which affect their neighbor-
hoods. 102 The call for greater citizen participation in land use policy
has been implemented by the increasing use of the initiative and refer-
endum to check local legislative decisions on land development
policy.
Perhaps the most renowned uprising was the passage of Proposition
20-the creation of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Com-
mission-by a voter referendum in California in 1972.103 Voters in
San Antonio, Texas, recently forced a referendum on a regional shop-
ping center approved by the San Antonio City Council and voted to
reverse the Council's approval.104 Other examples of voter referenda
limiting action of local governing bodies are to be found. 10 5 Many of
these programs and actions have been responses to the conviction that
there was no "rational relationship to a permissible municipal objective," the court
stated: "If a reduction in Boca Raton's overall residential densities to 40,000 units
would rationally promote public welfare without unnecessary and unreasonable conse-
quences to private property rights, the city could legally utilize a variety of techniques.
including a form of Cap." Id. at 4-5. For a description of the "housing cap" see Eins-
weiler, Gleeson, Ball, Morris & Sprague, Comparative Descriptions of Selected Munici-
pal Growth Guidance Systems: A Preliminary Report, in 2 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL
OF GROWTH 283, 299 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
Not all municipal initiatives have received judicial approval. See, e.g., Robinson v.
City of Boulder, 547 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1976) (overturning a municipality's refusal to
extend water and sewer service into a new area); Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc.
v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976) (re-
jecting New York City's effort to grant transferable development rights to a landowner
whose property was rezoned as "Special Park District" open to the public).
102. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING
& URBAN DEV., NEIGHBORHOOD PRESERVATION: A CATALOGUE OF LOCAL PROGRAMS
(1975).
103. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27001 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
104. San Antonio Express News, January 18, 1976, at 1, col. 1-A.
105. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council of San Diego,
13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (initiative to pass ordinance
limiting height of buildings in coastal zone); Builders Ass'n of Santa Clara/Santa Cruz
Counties v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974)
(moratorium on residential zoning passed by voters). For a brief summary of consti-
tutional amendments, initiatives, and referenda submitted to voters across the coun-
try in November 1974, many of which concerned land use or environmental issues.
see New Legislation, 27 LAND USE LAW AND ZONING DIGEST 20-27 (No. 2, 1975).
308
Land Regulation
municipal governments have lacked a resolve to resist the blandish-
ments and political pressure from interests seeking to use land for
their personal gain. 106 One can only speculate as to what effect the
United States Supreme Court decision in City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 07 which upheld a charter provision requiring
a referendum before final approval of land use changes, is going to
have in encouraging even greater resort to the polls to preclude new
development.
So this is an era when the old verities on land use policy are up for
grabs. The environmentalists, after five years of persistent victories,
sense a backlash and protest that the rape goes on unabated; the de-
velopers are incredulous that municipalities can lawfully take away
what they regard as their inalienable rights in property; and the civil
libertarians curse both their houses, confident that the ecologists too
often serve as a respectable if unwitting cover for less legitimate pur-
poses, yet nervous of making an entente with the builders against a
perceived common enemy. Finally, those associated with municipal
agencies are coming to realize that they are at the end of an era of
tranquility, at the close of a half century during which all powers to
regulate land use affairs were unquestionably municipal.
There may be a common ground upon which an acceptable accom-
modation among those divergent interests may be reached. What is
necessary is this: that a theoretical base for a land use policy be con-
structed that has some prospect for achieving reform, will be accept-
able to most interested parties, and is based on some established par-
allels in Anglo-American law and politics.
IV.
The flaw in the current debate on land policy is that the choices.
offered by the antagonists often are too extreme. Either the landowner
should be compelled by uncompensated regulation to make no eco-
nomic use of his land or, indeed, to dedicate it to the public, or he
should be free to do as he pleases, subject to whatever accommoda-
106. See generally M. MOGULOF, SAVING THE COAST 1-2 (1975).
107. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976). The United States Supreme Court held that the ref-
erendum did not violate the federal constitution. Within a few months of this decision,
eighteen Cleveland suburbs had adopted charter amendments requiring a referendum
on every zoning change. Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 18, 1976, § 1, at 1, pt. 2.
309
Washington Law Review
tion he can make with other landowners (neighbors) in any one of the
multitude of jurisdictions that may have some voice on a development
proposal.10 8 As long as the issues remain so polarized, a land use
policy acceptable to most people is unlikely. We believe the current
debate on land use policy may benefit from an examination of the
long-established treatment of businesses "affected with a public inter-
est" including, but not limited to, public utilities.
A century ago, in Munn v. Illinois,l09 the United States Supreme
Court held that Illinois could regulate the prices charged by ware-
housemen. The plaintiff alleged a "taking." The Court said govern-
ment can regulate "the conduct of its citizens one towards another and
the manner in which each shall own his own property, when such reg-
ulation becomes necessary for the public good."11 0 The Court added:
In their exercise [of these public powers] it has been customary in
England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first co-
lonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers,
millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a max-
imum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations
furnished, and articles sold. '11
The Court repeated the wisdom of Lord Chief Justice Hale: " [W] hen
private property is 'affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only.' "112
There is no magical formula in the Anglo-American precedents to
determine when a private interest is affected with a public interest and
ceases to be juris privati. Statutes and cases throughout the United
States suggest the breadth of regulation which has been applied to a
variety of businesses, commodities, or services. For example, among
the various items that have been subject to extensive regulation, in-
cluding in many instances the regulation of price, the quality of ser-
108. Consider, for example, the plight of the owners of wetlands who were denied
authority to fill their land by the Wisconsin and New Hampshire Supreme Courts in
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) and Sibson v. State.
336 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1975). Their lands in the natural state were not suitable for tme
owners' purposes yet they were not permitted to fill the land and they were awarded
no compensation. But see MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 340 N.E.2d 487 (Mass.
1976) in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned for tl~e third time a
municipality's denial of a permit to fill portions of a coastal marshland.
109. 94U.S. 113 (1876).
110. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 126.
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vice and, indeed, the prudence of investment and rate of return, are
milk,113 theatre tickets,114 alcoholic beverages, 1 5 bread, 1 6 used
cars,1 7 agricultural commodities,"18 water,l" 9 sewer services, 2 0 nat-
ural gas,' 21 electricity, 2 2 telephone and telegraph services, 123 trans-
portation services of all kinds, 2 4 warehouses, 125 docks, 126 toll
bridges,' 27 stockyards, 28 ice,' 29 steamheating, 30 and cotton gin-
ning,' 31 as well as other enterprises.
In Nebbia v. New York, 132 the Supreme Court upheld against a
due process challenge a New York statute establishing a milk control
board with authority to fix minimum and maximum retail prices. The
Court stated: "The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted
privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases.' 33
113. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Contra, Gwynette v. Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d
673 (1960).
114. Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
115. See, e.g., Dave's Market, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
222 Cal. App. 2d 671, 35 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1963); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter, 45 Misc. 2d 956, 258 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d
933, 259 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1965); Pompei Winery v. Board of Liquor Control, 167 Ohio
St. 61, 146 N.E.2d 430 (1957).
116. See, e.g., State v. Hudson House, Inc., 231 Or. 164, 371 P.2d 675 (1962).
117. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 145 W. Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1966); FordMotor
Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (1960).
118. See, e.g., Dighton v. Coffman, 178 F. Supp. 114, rehearing on additional
facts, 179 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Ill. 1959); Luke v. Review Comm., 155 F. Supp. 719
(W.D. La. 1957).
119. See, e.g., Lamb v. California Water & Tel. Co., 21 Cal: 2d 33, 129 P.2d 371
(1942).
120. See, e.g., In re Central Jersey Sewerage Co., 66 P.U.R.3d 387 (NJ. 1966).
121. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
122. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n v. Department of Pub. Util., 352 Mass.
18, 224 N.E.2d 502 (1967).
123. See, e.g., Granite State Alarm, Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., I ll N.H.
235, 279 A.2d 595 (1971).
124. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 207 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(airlines); River Lines, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 244, 398 P.2d 144, 42
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1965) (water carriers); Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 24 Cal.
2d 378, 150 P.2d 196 (1944) (street railway); City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 34 111. 2d 49, 213 N.E.2d 550 (1966) (railroad rates).
125. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Berger, 66 F. Supp. 950 (D. Alas. 1946).
127. See, e.g., Clarksburg--Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89
F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
128. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
129. See, e.g., Garner v. Tulsa Ice Co., 1976C P.U.R. 613 (Okla. 1916).
130. See, e.g., In re Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 89 P.U.R. 471 (N.D. 1950).
131. Oklahoma Cotton Ginners' Ass'n v. Walker, 168 Okla. 459, 33 P.2d 766
(1934).
132. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
133. Id. at 527-28.
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The Court also recognized that the selling of milk was not a public
utility, but nevertheless concluded that the sale of milk could be sub-
ject to state regulation:
We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the
accepted sense of the phrase, a public utility. We think the appellant is
also right in asserting that there is in this case no suggestion of any
monopoly or monopolistic practice. It goes without saying that those
engaged in the business are in no way dependent upon public grants or
franchises for the privilege of conducting their activities. But if, as
must be conceded, the industry is subject to regulation in the public
interest, what constitutional principle bars the state from correcting
existing maladjustments by legislation touching prices? We think there
is no such principle. 134
Due process required only that the law "not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. ' 135
Millers and wharfingers, theatre tickets, and used cars can hardly be
said to be more affected with a public interest than dealings in and the
use of land. Land is a limited if not depleting commodity which is inti-
mately bound up with our public health and welfare. It is a com-
modity the use and misuse of which can impose enormous public and
external costs. Yet land has been treated with a forbearance by the
public that is not extended, for example, to the ownership and sale of
natural gas or electricity, or the sale of liquor, or the use of the air
waves. The ownership of land is often identified with outrageous
profits and catastrophic losses, each such consequence more often
than not attributable to a spillover from some public act or expendi-
ture. When public surveillance of dealings in and use of scores of
other commodities is the accepted responsibility of the states or the
national government, the regulation of the use of land should not be
left to the caprice and parochial intents of multitudes of local govern-
ments, each defining the public welfare in its own image, or in the
image of a clutch of neighboring property owners.
Land, and as such its ownership, continues to benefit or suffer, in a
variety of quixotic ways, from an ancient inheritance that seems an-
achronistic in the last years of the Twentieth Century. We propose to
134. Id.at531-32.
135. ld. at 525.
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examine a few of the current issues in land use policy that might ben-
efit from an extension of the old constitutional doctrine that permits
public regulation of a "commodity affected with a public interest,"
whether or not that commodity or service is labelled a "public util-
ity."' 36
V.
A. Public Scrutiny of Profits and Performance
Alleged windfalls in land development--speculative profits-are a
common charge in many sections of the country. The protest is not-
ably strident when the windfalls to landowners are a result of the deci-
sions of public agencies to exercise land use or environmental controls
in a particular manner or to make investments of public funds in
public facilities which benefit particular land.137 A number of devices
have been suggested to extract from landowners some portion of the
public expenditures that increase the value of private land.138 Among
the more common techniques are special assessments, 13 9 and require-
ments that the developer dedicate land, improve public facilities, or
make payments to public agencies in lieu of dedication or improve-
ment.140 Vermont has adopted a Land Gains Tax in an effort to dis-
136. It should be emphasized that in most instances the analogues in public utility
and licensing laws assume that the entrepreneur will be a private profit-seeking agency,
not a public body. The licensed or regulated enterprise receives some protective bene-
fits, often in the form of a more-orderly or predictable market not extended to its coun-
terpart in the so-called free market, in return for the greater scrutiny to which it is
subjected. Because the entrepreneurial function remains in private hands, the decision
to enter the market rests with the private sector. Only after private enterprise alone
has made that decision does public scrutiny take place. The suggestion that our expe-
rience with public utility or licensing laws be extended to dealings in land carries with
it the assumption that private enterprise will continue to make the basic decisions of
when and how to develop what land. The contrary notion that government knows
best when and under what conditions to develop land flies in the face of our bleak
history the last twenty years of urban clearance, public housing, and highway construc-
tion, not to mention the recent unhappy course of the New York Urban Development
Corporation. This should not, however, be regarded as a dissent from proposals that
government should undertake land banking; only that the initial decision to -undertake
development should be by the private sector.
137. Professor Donald Hagman has spent two years researching this question. See
Hagman, supra note 92.
138. Id.at281-83.
139. See, e.g., 14 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.38
(3d ed. 1970).
140. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Builders, Inc. v. Midwest City, 539 P.2d 1377 (Okla.
1975) (requirement that builder install water mains and dedicate them to city held
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courage land speculation and, not so incidentally, out-of-state devel-
opers. 141 The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the tax law and ac-
knowledged that deterrence of land speculation may have been one of
the legislative purposes behind the taxes:
[W] e may take judicial notice of an increasing concern within the
State over the use and development of land as a natural
resource . . . . Speculation falls within the ambit of such concern as
a land use; indeed it has a bearing on many other uses to which the
land might be put. 142
"Recapture of value" recently has concerned those urban planners
and transit authorities who note the consequence to market values of
land abutting fixed rail transit stops. 143 Although it is not our purpose
to choose between specific techniques to recover a share of the profit
from these coups, we do suggest that advocates of "recapture" should
not have to apologize-let them look to traditional public utility regu-
lation.
The concept of a limitation to "fair rate of return" is not alien to
our legal system. The entrepreneur who enjoys a special status be-
cause of benefits conferred by the public has been subject to public
control over his rate of return for at least a century. In 1923, the
United States Supreme Court in Bluefield Water Works & Improve-
ment Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia144 dealt spe-
cifically with the issue of the return on investment to which a utility is
entitled and concluded that there is no constitutional right to such
profits as might be anticipated in other highly profitable or speculative
ventures:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a re-
turn on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience
not an unconstitutional taking). Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control
Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1967).
141. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 10001-10010 (Supp. 1974). See Baker, Controlling
Land Uses and Prices by Using Special Gain Taxation to Intervene in the Land Mar-
ket: The Vermont Experiment, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 427 (1975). The province
of Ontario, Canada, in an effort to restrain land speculation and the consequent in-
crease in land and housing prices, has enacted a Land Speculation Tax to tax gain on
the disposition of certain real estate. See Smith, The Ontario Land Speculation Tax:
An Analysis of an Utzearned Increment Land Tax, 52 LAND EcONOMICS 1 (1976).
142. Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860, 863 (1974).
143. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
144. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
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of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and
in the same general part of the country on investments in other busi-
ness undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and
uncertainties .... 145
In a subsequent case the Court held that the return can properly be
measured on the actual cost of the investment rather than any market
or reproduction cost or value. 146 Despite whatever increase in value
may accrue to the property of a public utility after an investment has
been made, there is no right on the part of the owners to realize that
increase at the expense of the ratepayers. Furthermore, it is clear that
a fair return is not to be mistaken for a publicly guaranteed rate of
return-witness the repeated wipeout of shareholders in railroad re-
organizations. 147
The only examples we have uncovered of direct government regula-
tion of prices affecting private land are rent controls imposed in var-
ious parts of the country. Such controls have been upheld as constitu-
tional exercises of governmental authority. 48 The supreme court of
New Jersey recently upheld rent controls adopted by the Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills. 49 The court reviewed a number of tests for
determining the fair value of rental property and indicated that utility
precedents are of value in determining whether rent controls permit a
reasonable return to the apartment owner. 50 In discussing the ques-
tion of what is a "just and reasonable return," the New Jersey court
145. Id. at 692.
146. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
147. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513, 516(1973) ('The right of a utility to receive just and reasonable rates is not a guarantee
of net revenues regardless of circumstances").
148. See, e.g., Bucho Holding Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n,
11 N.Y.2d 469, 184 N.E.2d 569, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1962). But cf. City of Miami
Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel Inc., 261 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1972) (city has no power to enact
a rent control ordinance without legislative authorization from the state).
149. Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 NJ. 604, 350 A.2d 34 (1975).
150. 350 A.2d at 43-46. The New Jersey court went on to discuss allowances for
expenses of apartment operators.
Finally, it should be noted that the constitution does not require that inefficient
operators be permitted the same return as efficient managers.... When an unrea-
sonable expense has been incurred, the court should reject it and substitute a
more reasonable alternative in its place. Plaintiff's books are, at best, merely
prima facie evidence of expenses. They are always open to question for lack of
reasonableness.
Id. at 46. The court also held that each apartment complex must be treated separately
and one cannot subsidize another.
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echoed the opinions of other courts that upheld the validity of public
regulation of private activity involving personal property or services:
[T] o be "just and reasonable" a rate of return must be high enough to
encourage good management including adequate maintenance of ser-
vices, to furnish a reward for efficiency, to discourage the flight of cap-
ital from the rental housing market, and to enable operators to main-
tain and support their credit. A just and reasonable return is one
which is generally commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks. On the other hand it is also
one which is not so high as to defeat the purposes of rent control nor
permit landlords to demand of tenants more than the fair value of the
property and services which are provided. The rate need not be as
high as existed prior to regulation nor as high as an investor might
obtain by placing his capital elsewhere.' 51
Rent controls, however, have had a rather limited application 5 2 and
do not directly control the often speculative and profitable transac-
tions involving the sale of land. More often than not they have been
inconsistent with a public rhetoric directed toward more and better
housing.
Decisions by the management of public utilities on capital expendi-
tures are scrutinized for inflated or imprudent investments to assure
that customers are not required to pay for facilities or to provide a
return on investment in facilities which are not reasonably required to
provide adequate service.15 3 As one court stated:
If . . . construction undertaken by the Company is "wasteful," or its
expense is unwarranted by the demand probable at the necessary price
for service produced by it, or if "proper economies in management are
lacking" so that operating expenditures are shown to be excessive or
overestimated, unwarranted investments may be excluded from rate
base, and unjustified expenditures from the determination of a reason-
able return. 154
151. Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
152. For example, some courts have held such ordinances can be justified only in
emergency situations. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922);
Block v. Hirsh. 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Baar & Keating. The Last Stand of Economic
Substantive Due Process-The Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Control,
7 URB. LAW. 447 (1975).
153. See, e.g., Latourneau v. Citizens Util. Co., 125 Vt. 38, 209 A.2d 307. 311
(1965) (expenditures for water rights unwarranted, therefore cannot be included in.
the rate base).
154. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d 9. 15 (1949).
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In determining the base on which a return is allowed for utility rates,
no allowance is permitted in the rate base for the monopoly value of
the franchise. 155 A leading text on public utility economics states the
general rule: "Although there is no dispute that the monopoly fran-
chise is valuable, it is recognized as having originated in a grant by the
public."'156 In land development, to the contrary, the monopoly inci-
dent to location near a public investment can be a major factor in a
windfall return.
Operations of utilities are also scrutinized to assure that some rea-
sonable degree of service is being rendered to the public.' 57 When a
utility fails to provide adequate service, regulatory agencies may re-
quire a utility to make such improvements as are deemed necessary. 58
The obligation to provide adequate service does not mean that a
utility must provide the highest possible quality of service, but, rather,
that service be reasonable in terms of public demands, costs, and the
condition of the utility. 59 In addition, the quality of the service a
utility renders the public has been held to be relevant to the question
of the allowable return on investment. 60 Where a utility provides
poor or inefficient service, it can expect regulatory agencies to be less
generous in setting an allowable return on investment. Conversely,
155. See, e.g., Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 U.S. 227,
237-38 (1934) (valuation above fair market value not allowed for the value of the
location of the bridge); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 281 N.C.
318, 189 S.E.2d 705 (1972). The North Carolina court said rates are determined with
certain objectives:
(1) To produce a fair profit for its stockholders, in view of current economic
conditions, (2) maintain its facilities and service, and (3) compete in the market
for capital.... The fixing of rates for service which will enable the utility to do
these things, and no more, is the ultimate objective of rate making.
189 S.E.2d at 738.
156. P. GARFIELD, supra note 68, at 85.
157. See, e.g., Elk Run Tel. Co. v. General Tel. Co., 160 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa
1968); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 86 Nev. 662, 474 P.2d 379
(1970); Northwestern Tel. Serv. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 175 Ohio St. 300, 194
N.E.2d 434 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-131(b) (1975); VA. CODE § 56-234 (1974).
158. 1 A77PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 276 (1969).
159. F. WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 127 (1968).
160. See, e.g., In re General Tel. Co., 89 P.U.R.3d 92 (Ark. 1971); In re New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 130 (Mass. 1970); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n
v. General Tel. Co., 285 N.C. 671, 208 S.E.2d 681 (1974); In re United Tel. Co., 2
P.U.R.4th 299, 311 (NJ. 1973); In re Newport Elec. Corp., 96 P.U.R.3d 306 (R.I.
1972).
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that one of the functions of the Illinois Com-
merce Commission is to maintain "a balance between the rates charged by utilities
and the services performed." Village of Apple River v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
18 Il. 2d 518, 523, 165 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1960).
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"[t] he reasonable rate to be prescribed by a commission may allow
an efficiently managed utility much more."' 61
The law is clear that parties making the decision to conduct busi-
ness vitally affecting the public interest, such as utilities, can be sub-
ject to extensive regulation with respect to the quality of the service
they provide, the return they will be permitted to earn at the expense
of the public, and the reasonableness of the investments they make in
conducting the business. It seems reasonable that when public expend-
itures or the exercise of public authority enhance the value, and con-
sequently the profits, of that vital but limited public resource, land, it
is proper that the public exercise some overview of the profit the
owner of land will realize from that property. Such oversight should
assure that the public not be forced to pay a price which gives the
land speculator unreasonable profits attributable to public favors.
The only reason such a suggestion may be shocking is because it is
land, not traditional utility or common carrier services, being con-
sidered. It is an inadequate rejoinder to assert that utility regulation is
based on the need to control an essential natural monopoly such as
gas or electricity. That begs the question. Gas and electricity are in
competition, both between themselves and with unregulated forms of
energy. The finite land which is available clearly is no less essential to
society. Why then should transactions in land not be subject to greater
and less parochial public scrutiny than is the case today?
The apparent difficulties in transplanting similar public controls to
profit, price, and service in land development may be real or they may
only appear perplexing because of our historical block concerning
transactions in land. Surely, the development of a regulatory system
would involve no more obtuse jargon and sanctified formulae than
have accompanied the evolution of the regulation of pricing, profit,
and quality of service by regulated utilities. Today the developer who
proposes a large scale land development under a planned development
ordinance must negotiate every aspect of his proposal from allowable
densities to contributions of cash or land. There is no reason why he
should not also be subject to scrutiny over the prudence of his invest-
ment and the rate of his return. The developer should be bound as
161. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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well to his representations on quality of service. 162 One thing seems
sure-such a reform would underscore the need to shift decisions over
major land development from the municipality to the state with the
former playing the role of advocate, either for or against the proposal,
in a state forum. 163
B. Quotas and Priorities: Quantitative Controls and Permissible
Discrimination
A second and subsfantially different land use issue might benefit
from an examination of the precedents in not only utility but also li-
censing law. The traditional zoning rationale tells municipalities to
take into account "the character of the district."' 64 Under traditional
land use dogma "more is better." The first intrusion is the excuse, le-
162. For example, in allocating station licenses, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) must take into account the adequacy of the service provided by radio
and television licensees to the communities they serve. Those licensees that fail to
provide sufficient community oriented programs and a fair treatment of issues of pub-
lic concern may find themselves without a new license as did a television station in
Jackson, Mississippi, which lost its license because of its racially biased programming.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). In its supervision of station licenses, the FCC must also consider the pro-
gram format of existing licensees to determine whether a change in the format that
may result from FCC action is in the public interest. Citizens Committee to Save
WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that if the transfer of a license would result in the loss of a
classical music format that would be suffered by a special audience, the FCC had to
consider whether the transfer would serve the public interest. Id. at 262.
163. Regulatory agencies at the state level have been responsible for utility regula-
tion in most states for most of the twentieth century. See FEDERAL POWER COMM'N,
FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION OF ELECTRIC, GAS AND
TELEPHONE UTILITIES, TABLE 5, REGULATION OF RATES-MISCELLANEOUS 14 (1973).
What movement there has been to shift the locus of utility regulation authority in
recent years has been in the direction of removing what authority existed in munici-
palities to state agencies. For example, Minnesota has expanded the role of its Public
Service Commission to include regulation of electric and natural gas utilities, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 216B.01-.67 (Supp. 1976), while South Dakota and Texas have created
new state regulatory agencies superceding municipal authorities. S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. ch. 49-34A (Supp. 1976); TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1446c (Vernon Supp.
1975-76). The pitfalls of scattered municipal regulation of utilities was illustrated in
Texas where the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company was discovered keeping two
sets of books-one for its own internal purposes and one to show municipal officials
when seeking rate hikes. Bell Explains Two Sets of Books, San Antonio Express-News,
Nov. 28, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 3; Bell's Rate Computations Allow Extra Profits, San
Antonio Express-News, Dec. 12, 1974, § A, at 2, col. 1. It is unlikely that utility regu-
lation will be shifted back to municipalities.
164. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (1924); 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 2.25 (1968); 8 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.24 (3d
ed. 1965).
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gally, for the next. The presence of one gas station at an intersection is
the justification for a second. The first highrise to enter the three-story
brownstone neighborhood is the camel's nose under the tent for a wall
of highrises. The first half-way house in a neighborhood is often the
precursor of another and another. And the rub with the "fair share"
low-income housing schemes--even if they do prove to be more than
noble proclamations-is that they do not protect the participating
communities from the developer who is not a party to an intermuni-
cipal agreement and sees a financial opportunity in exceeding the
quota in a particular community. If a developer selects his neighbor-
hood with care, the traditional zoning doctrine which looks to the
"character of the neighborhood" will facilitate his effort to break the
"fair share" plan. In short, in land use law today there is little law to
justify quantitative controls, a concept that may be essential to brake
the tendency of the real estate market to congregate.
The concept of quotas is nothing new to licensing law. The first
statute in England to provide for a limit on the number of ale houses
was Henry VII's law of 1495.165 Five centuries later, state and munic-
ipal governments in the United States have similar authority over dis-
pensers of intoxicating beverages and the presence of five taverns may
be a legal basis for a public decision to exclude a sixth. 166 The con-
cept of priorities and quotas--discrimination if you will-when au-
thorized by the public agency, is also well established in public utility
law. For example, the number of available radio frequencies is lim-
ited. To avoid confusion and interference that could result from at-
tempts by radio broadcasters to utilize frequencies without adequate
consideration to the use of the same frequency by others, the United
States Congress enacted provisions of the Communications Act of
1934167 requiring the licensing of radio broadcasting.1 68 The Federal
Communications Commission controls the number of radio and tele-
165. The Evolution of the 'Pub'-A Sketch of the Earlier History of the Licensing
Laws, 20 THE L. REV. 316 (1904).
166. See, e.g., Miller v. Zoning Comm'n, 135 Conn. 405, 65 A.2d 577 (1949)
(upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited permits if another establishment selling
alcohol was within 1500 feet); Paron v. City of Shakopee, 226 Minn. 222, 32 N.W.2d
603 (1948) (upholding limitation to five licensed premises within the city).
167. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
168. Id. §§ 301-99. See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940).
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vision licenses permitted to operate in a given area and the conditions
under which the licensees operate. 169
Perhaps the most graphic and recent examples authorizing public
regulatory agencies to establish priorities or quotas regarding the pro-
vision of goods and services are the various programs used by natural
gas distribution companies to deal with gas shortages by means of a
freeze on new attachments to protect existing customers or by a limit
on deliveries to existing customers. Among applicants for new gas ser-
vice, utilities are permitted, even directed to give priority to residential
consumers over commercial and industrial users.' 70 Such actions are
designed to preserve a limited amount of fuel which may be declining
in relation to the demand to assure a supply for those residential con-
sumers least able to secure an alternative.' 71
In land use regulation a quota system will, of course, raise difficult
problems of equity. Quantitative control over half-way houses or gas
stations is relatively easy. If, however, my neighbor obtains permission
to build the only high-rise in the block, this undoubtedly confers spe-
cial privileges on him, but in addition, and unlike the radio license, it
may have an adverse impact on the marketability of my neighboring
property for a single family home or a duplex. The answer may re-
quire a payment to me by the high-rise "licensee" as consideration for
my convenant not to develop. In effect, I would share in his develop-
ment profits.
Existing land use controls do discriminate and establish priorities to
the extent they define what uses may be carried out on what land. It is
instructive, however, to contrast the experience in land use control
169. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
170. E.g., In re Columbia Gas of W. Va., Inc., 10 P.U.R.4th 146 (W. Va. 1975).
For example, utilities have been directed to refuse to provide gas to heat new swim-
ming pools and to discontinue service to restaurants that continue to use certain types
of decorative gas lamps. See National Swimming Pool Inst. v. Kahn, 48 App. Div. 2d
736, 367 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1975); Leroy Fantasies, Inc. v. Swidler, 44 App. Div. 2d
266, 354 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1974); Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977," Pub. L. No.
95-2, 1 ENERGY MANAGEMENT (CCH) 1021-34 (1977), which authorizes the
President, for a limited period of time, to allocate natural gas supplies among inter-
state pipelines if severe natural gas shortages in any region endanger supplies to "high-
priority uses."
171. The same social policy that seeks to protect the utility services to individual
residential customers vis-A-vis large industrial or commercial users can be seen in util-
ity rate structures that may impose a higher rate on industrial or commercial customers
than on residential customers because service has a higher "value" to such users. See
J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 83-84 (1961); P. GARFIELD
supra note 68, at 142-45.
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systems with public utility regulatory agencies that have authority to
establish priorities and to order the regulated utilities to meet the
priorities so that the over-all public interest is served. Land use con-
trol systems have little muscle in today's world to assure that whatever
priorities are set will in fact find expression in actual land use and
development beyond precluding non-priority uses or developments.
Some recent efforts to require a specified percentage of low and mod-
erate income housing as a condition to approval of a subdivision have
not met with success. 172
We question whether there is a constitutional principle which com-
pels a distinction between the establishment and implementation of
priorities and quotas in the sale of electricity or natural gas but not in
the sale and development of land.
Occasionally there will be a measure such as the Massachusetts
"anti-snob" zoning legislation that permits a qualified developer of
low-income housing, with the approval of a state agency, to override
local zoning that prevents such housing.'73 Some recent court opin-
ions have suggested that community development controls will not be
upheld if they do not accept a "fair share" of housing demand, 174 do
not give "the opportunity for the location of appropriate housing for
all classes of our citizenry,"' 75 or do not balance the local desire to
maintain the status quo within the community with regional housing
needs.' 76 However laudable such judicial responses may be, courts
recognize they are unable to effectively cure problems of lack of
housing in absence of direct government action. 177 Significant con-
172. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. De Groff, 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600
(1973). See also Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th
Cir. 1974). But see Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma, 522
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), which upheld a plan of
the City of Petaluma, California to limit the number of new dwelling units to be per-
mitted during a five-year period. The plan required that approximately eight to twelve
percent of the units be constructed specifically for low and moderate income persons.
522 F.2d at 908, n.16.
173. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B. §§ 20-23 (West Supp. 1976-77).
174. Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445. 341 A.2d
466, 468 (1975).
175. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713. 731
(1975).
176. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102. 341 N.E.2d 236. 242. 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
177. E.g., NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151. 170 n.8, 336 A.2d
713, 722 n.8; id. at 208, 211, 336 A.2d at 741. 743-44 (Pashman, J ., concurring).
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struction of housing for people iri all income ranges is unlikely
without appropriate carrots or sticks provided by public agencies.' 78
If "fair share" is to become a standard for judging the validity of
land use regulations that affect housing, it will be necessary to
abandon the "more is better" philosophy and introduce quantitative
controls and discrimination. A community which has accepted its
"fair share" should not be required to accept more simply because a
developer sees an opportunity to make money.
It is possible that selectivity, legitimate discrimination, and quanti-
tative controls, all common to public utility and licensing law, may
inject themselves into. land use policy by way of environmental law. A
developer's right to build homes may depend less upon the zoning he
can get than where he stands in line on hookups to the public sewer.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency has authority to
prohibit local sewage treatment plants from accepting any new
connections if the plant does not have adequate capacity to treat addi-
tional sewage. 179 Sewer connection moratoria are not uncommon. 180
Indeed, some municipalities have attempted with mixed success to use
sewers as one element in a growth control plan. 181 Availability of pot-
178. See Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of
Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1, 71 (1976). The authors have been told
that one reason Indianapolis has so much good subsidized housing well scattered
throughout Marion County is that the Planning Commission follows a policy of
granting permission to build market housing to those developers who have had a good
record of building subsidized housing.
179. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (Supp.
1976). Limitations may also be placed on industrial or other development which
contributes to air pollution through effectuation of the air quality maintenance and
"significant deterioration" requirements under the federal Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §
1857 (1970); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 4 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). Under regulations
adopted by the EPA, the quantity of new air-polluting development will be limited
and quotas are set depending on the area and the condition of its air. 40 C.F.R. §§
51.18, 52.21 (1976). Some flexibility in the administration of the significant deteriora-
tion quotas is being proposed by EPA in its "tradeoff" policy pursuant to which new
industry would be permitted to locate in areas where air quality standards are not
being met provided other existing sources agree to reduce their pollution so there is no
net increase in pollution when the new industry is in operation. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency Draft Preamble to Interpretative Ruling on New Source Review Re-
quirements, [ 1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1091.
180. E.g., Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F.
Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975). See Ackerman, supra note 178, at 60.
181. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972) which upheld a timed development ordinance which looked,
among other things, to the availability of sewers as a condition to granting building
authorizations. But see Robinson v. City of Boulder, 547 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1976) in
which the Colorado Supreme Court held that the City of Boulder could not base its
refusal to extend water and sewer service into an area outside its corporate boundaries
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able water may also result in severe limitations on growth and devel-
opment.1 82
Some of the state land use and environmental initiatives designed to
protect particularly sensitive ecological areas may provide a justifica-
tion for selecting and limiting, if not mandating, the quantity as well
as the type of development which may take place in designated areas.
The New Jersey Coastal Area Facility Review Act,183 the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972,184 the New York Adiron-
dack Park Agency Act,185 and the Washington Shoreline Management
Act' 8 6 are examples of legislation that require the balancing of the
need for development with a public interest in preserving areas
deemed of some particular significance to the public. For example, the
New Jersey law requires development of a comprehensive plan se-
lected from identified alternative "environmental management strate-
gies which take into account the paramount need for preserving envi-
ronmental values and the legitimate need for economic and residential
growth within the coastal area."1 87 Such environmental controls could
compel a choice between alternative proposals for development that
might in turn introduce a social purpose by extending a priority to
those builders who include some low-income housing in their develop-
ments.
Introduction of a social purpose into land use regulation would
bring regulation into line with public utility law, which has seen regu-
latory agencies begin to take more and more interest in protecting the
right of disadvantaged classes to utility services at reasonable rates.
in which it was the sole provider of such services on the ground that growth in the
particular area was not consistent with its comprehensive plan.
182. See Swanson v. Marin Mun. Water Dist. 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 128 Cal. Rptr.
485 (1976) where the court of appeals upheld a moratorium on new water service
imposed by a municipal water district where there was a proven shortage of water.
In upholding the district, the court said:
[W]e are not unmindful of the somewhat dire consequences which flow from
our decision in this matter. Politically. the power to "cut off one's water" by the
simple expedient of imposing a moratorium such as the one here involved is a
potent weapon in effecting a no-growth policy within a community. Since District
has neither the power nor the authority to initiate or implement such a policy, the
imposition of any restriction on the use of its water supply for that purpose would
be invalid.
Id. at 524, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 13:19 (West Supp. 1976-77).
184. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
185. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 800 et seq. (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1975-76).
186. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (Supp. 1976).
187. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-16 (West Supp. 1976-77).
324
Vol. 52: 289, 1977
Land Regulation
Utility regulatory agency requirements that "lifeline" services be made
available at lower than normal monthly rates reflect special considera-
tion for the elderly, the poor, and the infirm. Such services permit cus-
tomers to receive a bare minimum amount of electric or telephone
service to meet emergencies and basic needs without having to pay the
normal rates which permit middle class suburbanites to satisfy their
desires for a variety of conveniences.188 Concern for protection of cus-
tomers against arbitrary denial or termination of utility service by util-
ities over-zealous to protect revenues againsf nonpayment of bills has
led courts and regulatory agencies to take a more active role in po-
licing utility credit and service termination practices and in requiring
utilities to adopt more explicit procedural guidelines and safeguards to
deal with credit and bill payment matters. 189
The usefulness of quotas and priorities in land use controls is not
limited to housing needs. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission (BCDC) recognized the danger of running
out of industrial waterfront sites which do not require additional
filling of the Bay. In order to assure utilization of waterfront sites in a
manner consistent with the over-all objectives of the BCDC plan, the
BCDC has established priorities by designating certain areas exclu-
sively for the use of "water-related industries."' 9 0
C. Protection of Existing Development from Economic Competition
There is a third area where the experience in public utility regula-
tion may offer some lessons in the formulation of land use policy.
188. See In re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 94 P.U.R.3d 321, 346 (Mich. 1972); In re
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 476, 496 (R.I. 1972); Pace, The Poor, the
Elderly, and the Rising Cost of Energy, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 5, 1975, at 26. But
see Rhode Island Consumers' Council v. Smith, Il1 R.I. 271, 302 A.2d 757 (1973);
In re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 P.U.R.4th 87 (Ore.
1976).
189. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Stan-
ford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kans. 1972). Note, Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services for Nonpayment, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1477 (1973); Note, Public Utilities and the Poor: The Requirement of Cash
Deposits from Domestic Consumers, 78 YALE LJ. 448 (1969).
190. Claude Gruen & Associates, engaged by BCDC to review the industrial por-
tion of the BCDC plan, recommended that BCDC revise its definition of "water-
related industries" so that the test for determining whether an industry should be per-
mitted would turn on "whether or not an industry would produce less benefit to the
region if it were excluded from the bayfront." Gruen, Gruen & Associates, Waterfront
Industry Study, A Report to: San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Com-
mission IV-A (July 8, 1976).
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Public utility plants and facilities are expensive private undertakings
and it is generally believed that the public interest is best served if util-
ities are granted monopolies to serve specified areas. The reasoning is
that the monopoly permits utility service to be provided economically
and efficiently because the public does not have to pay for the con-
struction and operation of duplicative and costly utility systems.' 91
The utility also receives some benefit because it is assured a defined
market relatively free of competition with respect to the particular
service it provides. ' 92 In return for its limited monopoly, the utility is
subject to regulation with respect to its rates, return on investment and
the quality and manner of service it provides. The utility is protected,
however, only so long as it provides adequate service; it may be com-
pelled by law to improve service or give up its franchise.' 93
The monopolies granted do not in all instances relieve utilities from
competition. Particularly in the energy field, competition is still signif-
icant. Electricity may replace gas or oil for heating purposes. For the
individual homeowner, however, this freedom to substitute different
fuels does not come without expensive alterations to heating equip-
ment that substantially reduces any real competition.
In land use law, the suggestion that regulation may have as a legiti-
mate purpose the protection of existing uses from competition is
greeted by the charge that such is improper. Some cases maintain that
the use of zoning regulations to control competition is ultra vires or
unconstitutional, 194 while others suggest that control of competition
cannot be the dominant purpose in zoning.' 95 These responses are
bemusing in light of the monopolistic consequences of the traditional
zoning treatment of nonconforming uses, 196 and the common and
accepted litany in zoning cases that apartments may be excluded from
single-family districts because, among other consequences, apartments
will damage existing single-family property values. ' 97
191. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 171, at 11.
192. See Dickinson v. Maine Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 223 A.2d 435. 438 (Me. 1966).
193. E.g., Preston County Light & Power Co. v. Renick. 45 W. Va. 115. 113
S.E.2d 378 (1960).
194. E.g., Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961); Circle
Lounge & Grille, Inc., v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
195. E.g., Pearce v. Village of Edina, 118 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1962); In re Lieb.
179 Pa. Super. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955). See Mandelker. Control of Competition as
a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14 ZONING DIG. 33 (1962).
196. SeeCityofAurorav. Burns, 319 III. 84, 149N.E. 782(1925).
197. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 170-79 (1966); 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW ch. 50 (1974).
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If it is a desirable public policy in the provision of utility services to
grant at least limited monopolies in order to avoid wasteful duplica-
tion of facilities and resources,198 there also may be a public interest
in a land use policy which seeks to provide more protection than is
allowed by traditional zoning dogma against the exploitation for pri-
vate gain of limited land resources in a manner unnecessarily duplica-
tive of and potentially destructive of existing land uses serving the
same community of interest. Suppose, for example, a city with a pop-
ulation of 100,000, an urban center in a rural setting, has seen its cen-
tral business district deteriorate and decides to remedy the situation.
With substantial federal aid and considerable local effort, private and
public, it starts to revitalize its central business district. It persuades a
major retail chain to rebuild in the run-down central business district.
It creates the usual mall, gets a national chain to operate a new hotel
and, generally, decides to fight downtown blight. Should the munici-
pality be permitted to use its zoning power to deny a building permit
to a developer who wants to construct a regional shopping center on
the fringe of the city on the candid basis that the regional shopping
center is a threat to the revitalization of its central business district
which, in turn, is regarded as essential to the health of the entire city?
It is absurd to deny that zoning regulations have an impact on eco-
nomic competition whether among commercial or residential develop-
ments.19 9 Courts that subscribe to the doctrine that zoning may not
have as its sole or primary purpose the regulation of business competi-
tion are left with the thorny problem of trying to decipher when a
zoning ordinance is intended solely or primarily to effect competition.
In 1969 a superior court of New Jersey upheld a zoning ordinance
which was designed to restrict retail sales to the central business dis-
trict.2 00 The court rejected the claim by the owners of a tract of land
located in an outlying area, who wished to construct a supermarket,
that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional. The court held that
the municipality had a right to enact measures designed to revitalize
the central business area. Although the zoning ordinance might give
the central area a virtual monopoly over new retail business, the court
did not invalidate the ordinance. It was willing, however, to suggest
that the municipality had a right to restrict competition and suggested
198. See P. GARFIELD, supra note 68, at 15.
199. 1 N. ANDERSON, supra note 164, § 7.28; R. BABCOCK, supra note 197, at 70-79.
200. Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 NJ. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969).
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that the exclusion of competition was simply "an incident or effect of
otherwise valid zoning." 201 A California court of appeal upheld a
city's denial of a permit to construct an automobile service station. 202
The court accepted the traditional litany that zoning regulation
cannot be used to control economic competition, but it stated that "so
long as the primary purpose of the zoning ordinance is not to regulate
economic competition, but to subserve a valid objective pursuant to a
city's police powers, such ordinance is not invalid even though it
might have an indirect impact on economic competition.."203
These and other cases204 demonstrate that zoning regulation affects
competition, but that is not acceptable advocacy to say so. Other courts
have recognized that the absence of a public need for a particular use
is a valid factor to be considered in judging the reasonableness of a
zoning ordinance.205 But despite such opinions, courts are generally
inclined to the proposition that where the declared purpose of land use
regulation is to protect specific economic interests the regulation is in-
valid, but if another "valid" purpose is stated with the incidental effect
being to restrict economic competition, the regulation is proper. We
suggest there is no legitimate public interest served, beyond the pos-
sible encouragement of creative ordinance drafting, in forcing courts
to probe the minds of local officials to determine whether a zoning or-
201. 255 A.2d at 806.
202. Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971).
203. Id. at 128, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The "primary purpose" dogma is not un-
known in zoning law. The early cases involving attempts to regulate aesthetics held
that such was not invalid so long as aesthetic considerations were not the primary
purpose. E.g., Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 11. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942); Perl-
mutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932). More recently some courts have
upheld restrictive land use regulations solely on aesthetic grounds. People v. Stover. 12
N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963); McCormick v. Lawrence,
83 Misc. 2d 64, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See generally I N. WILLIAMS,
supra note 59, ch. I1. The same cautious trend may be expected in the case of eco-
nomic zoning.
204. See, e.g., American Oil Company v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. App. 301.
310 A.2d 796 (1973); In re Lieb, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 318. 116 A.2d 860, 865 (1955).
205. In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
the Oregon Supreme Court held invalid a rezoning of property from single-family
residential to planned residential to allow a trailer park in part because the party seek-
ing the change had not established the public need for the change. The Illinois Supreme
Court has also recognized, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that the need or lack
of need of a community for a proposed use is relevant in evaluating zoning decisions.
Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park. 19 Il. 2d 370. 167 N.E.2d 406. 411
(1960). See, e.g., Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758
(1973); Rigby v. Crate, 15 App. Div. 2d 605, 222 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1961); Barrett v.,
Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975); Duddles v. City Council, 535 P.2d 583
(Ore. 1975).
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dinance in fact has as its primary purpose the regulation of economic
competition or is intended to achieve other public purposes. Regula-
tion that confers economic benefits is an accepted concept in other
areas of law and should be similarly accepted in dealings with land. It
seems strange that the character of a single-family neighborhood can
be "protected" from a multiple family dwelling, but a central business
district cannot be protected from an outlying shopping center. In pub-
lic utility law the issue would be whether the central business district
is providing adequate sevice. If it is, it will be protected; if it is not, it
will be required to shape up or a competitor will be franchised. 20 6
A rule of law that flatly rejects the employment of land use regula-
tion to protect existing development from adverse economic competi-
tion on the ground that land use policy cannot protect one enterprise
from another is not only hypocritical, but also blind to important
public concerns as well as to long accepted public policy doctrines.
Before the turn of this century, public utility and licensing laws had
sanctioned the protection of existing enterprises from uncontrolled
competition in appropriate circumstances, not for the purpose of con-
ferring a benefit on the protected enterprises, but because it is believed
that some public interest is thereby advanced. The same considera-
tions could be usefully employed in land use law if the mystique sur-
rounding the ownership of land were shed.
D. Land Assembly
A final illustration of an area in land use policy where experience in
public utility law may be instructive is the assembly of land, a trying
experience for the private entrepreneur. A variety of techniques have
been proposed or utilized by public agencies to amass sufficient land
to permit development of a single large parcel. Land banking by
public agencies has been employed in a number of European coun-
tries, particularly Sweden and the Netherlands, and has been widely
acclaimed as a mechanism for encouraging orderly urban growth.
Advocates of land banking suggest it is a viable means to control
urban land sprawl and to assure that land development is soundly
206. The record of municipal parochialism that has led to much of the current
"revolution" in land use policy requires that such a major decision should ultimately
be settled in a forum more detached than the city council, probably in a state agency.
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planned.2 0 7 The Model Land Development Code approved by the
American Law Institute in 1975 contains an article on Land Banking
which provides for the creation of a State Land Reserve Agency with
authority to acquire land "for the public purpose of achieving the land
policy and land planning objectives of this State .... 208 Although
still an untried technique in the United States, 209 legislation author-
izing land banking in Puerto Rico has been upheld by the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court and an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was dismissed.2 10
We surmise, however, that most land development in the United
States will continue to be undertaken by private enterprise. Unlike
public agencies, private land developers today do not have the power
to condemn, nor should they be so endowed, given our present frac-
tured system of control over land development. If, however, some of
the old precepts applicable to businesses "affected with a public inter-
est," such as the concept of a limitation to a fair rate of return based
on prudent capital investment, a duty to provide adequate facilities
and services, and, above all, a consistency of land development with
publicly articulated development policies, were introduced into land
development, then those public standards would be consistent with a
207. Reps, Tile Future of Anerican Planning, Requiem or Renascense, in AMER-
ICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1967; SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
ASPO NATIONAL PLANNING CONFERENCE 47 (1967); M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND
CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 355, 363 (1971); Note, Public Land Banking: A
New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897 (1972). See also K.
PARSONS, H. BUDKE. S. CLEMHOUT. P. FARRELL. J. PROST, & E. ROBERTS. PUBLIC LAND
ACQUISITION FOR NEW COMMUNITIES AND THE CONTROL OF UBAN GROWTH: ALTERNA-
TIVE STRATEGIES 209 (1973). a report prepared for the New York State Urban De-
velopment Corporation proposing initiation and funding of a land banking operation.
208. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 6-101 (1975).
209. Under various existing state and federal laws, public agencies are authorized
to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire tracts of land for the construction
of public housing or for other urban redevelopment projects, and proposals have been
made for extensive use of such power. The National Commission on Urban Problems
advocated that government assert its concern for rational urban development by ob-
taining land through purchase or eminent domain. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 251-53. The Task Force of the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund
recommended establishment of public entities comparable to New York's Urban De-
velopment Corporation to undertake large scale development projects with the power
of eminent domain. TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 2. at
261.
210. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Rosso, 95 P.R.R. 488 (1967), appeal dis-
missed per curian, 393 U.S. 14 (1968). Translated excerpts of the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico appear in Callies. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v.,
Rosso: Land Banking and the Expanded Concept of Public Use, 2 PROSPECTUS 199
(1968).
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system that authorized a state agency to issue a certificate of authority
to private enterprise to condemn for the purpose of land assembly, at
least in large-scale undertakings. An electric or gas utility may obtain
the right to condemn, provided its proposal for development, for
example, to construct a new pipeline, is found by an appropriate reg-
ulatory authority to be required for the public convenience and neces-
sity.21 ' When such a finding is made after an adversary proceeding,
the public interest is served by permitting private enterprise to exercise
this sovereign power. The sad record of flirtation with new towns is
attributable to a multitude of public and private sins,2 12 but at least
the delays and costs in getting such projects under way would have
been substantially reduced had the developers had the certified au-
thority--essential in negotiating-to condemn.
It is ironic that in a tentative draft of the American Law Institute's
Model Land Development Code,213 the Reporters and the Advisory
Committee proposed just such a power for developers of large-scale
projects provided, first, that the developers assemble a substantial per-
centage of the land by purchase2 14 and second, that their development
receive approval from the state planning agency.21 5 Because many
ALI members were lawyers with utility clients, it was assumed this
suggestion would receive a sympathetic response. The idea was
squashed decisively by the members of the ALI who reacted not as
utility lawyers but as residents of suburban communities. The attitude
seemed to be that no land developer should have such authority.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that models of regulation of businesses affected
with the public interest, including public utilities, may be instructive
in dealing with transactions in land. We do not propose that any such
regulatory mechanisms could or should be applied wholesale to all
land development or transactions in land. There are many practical
and conceptual difficulties in the application of licensing and public
211. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-213, § 63 (1973); 2 A. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 7.52 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1976).
212. E.g., Stuart, Government and Private Backers Face Huge Losses in Housing
Plans, New York Times, Dec. 12, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 3.
213. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Ten. Draft No. 5, 1973).
214. Id.§ 4-302.
215. Id.§ 4-304.
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utility concepts to the development of land or to transactions in land.
The variety of interests in land are more subtle and complex than are
the interests in the goods and services that are now extensively regu-
lated for prudence of investment, price and quality of service. There is
an understandable public interest in assuring a substantial uniformity
in the availability of natural gas, electricity, telephone service, or
milk. Individuals who trade and invest in land, however, look for var-
ious locations, differing amenities, and other characteristics which will
make their demands and needs difficult to fit into a uniform public
policy. People have different tastes with respect to whether they live
on a corner, along a lakeshore, in the middle of a city, in a rural set-
ting, with a south or a north view, near or far away from a school, or
any variety of other factors.
The factors that affect the value individuals will place on particular
real property may also be of a different nature than those encountered
in some of the more traditional systems regulating personal property.
Regulatory mechanisms that deal with other commercial enterprises
do, however, recognize the need to accommodate varying needs and
interests. The rate tariffs of a typical gas, telephone, or electric utility
illustrate the wide variation in types of services available and the mul-
titude of price levels which may be charged. Various grades of party
line service, private line service, service with unlimited calling privi-
leges in a specified geographic area, extended area service, and a va-
riety of options give the subscriber a wide choice of services de-
pending on how much the individual wants to pay and how many of
the services he wants to use.
All transactions in land cannot be subjected to detailed utility-type
regulatory oversight; such a system would be intolerable. Nevertheless,
the application of such mechanisms to those developments or transac-
tions which exceed a specified dollar amount or acreage would be fea-
sible. The exemption of small transactions from regulation is a fa-
miliar concept in American law. Securities laws, both federal and
state, contain exemptions with respect to registration requirements for
small offerings of securities. 216 Experience under such exemptions
suggests they must be carefully designed to assure that the overall
public purpose behind regulation is not defeated by activities which
216. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b). 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(b) (1970); Reg-
ulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-63; UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 402(b)(9).
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are conducted on a small enough scale to escape regulation but which
on an incremental basis could undermine the public goals.
The problem of a remedy against a land developer who does not
live up to his or her representations or carry out the conditions of his
or her license may, as a conceptual matter, seem awkward to put
right. Once a building or other improvement is constructed, courts are
reluctant to require its removal. Indeed, once land development ac-
tivity has commenced, it may be impossible to restore natural features
of the environment destroyed in the development process. Part of this
problem can be dealt with by requiring developers and land specula-
tors to demonstrate their financial and other capabilities as a condi-
tion of permission to undertake their activities. Bonding is a common
means of protection against default. Licensing of various trades, busi-
nesses, and professions, conditioned upon standards concerning the
character and responsibility-financial or otherwise--of the licensee,
is common. 217 Utilities generally are not permitted to begin their oper-
ations and vend their services until a certificate of public convenience
and necessity is obtained.218 In this way the public is able to exercise
some oversight to assure that an activity is conducted by someone
with the expertise, resources and capability necessary to carry it
through.
Analogy to other fields of public interest regulation suggests several
other potential remedial devices. For example, licensees under the
FCC are subject to periodic review and renewal and their licenses to
operate are, at least as a matter of law, revocable. The concept of a
forced divestiture of ownership is not unknown to the antitrust
laws.219 The availability of such iemedies as non-renewal of a license or
divestiture would generate a greater concern by the entrepreneur for
compliance with the dictates of the public interest than has been the
case under the present system of land use regulation.
As counsel for public utilities, the authors know, and from time to
time have shouted, all the usual complaints about utility regulation:
* 217. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has substantial author-
ity to establish qualifications of brokers and dealers in securities. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970). Among other things, the
SEC has adopted the so-called "Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers"
rule relating to the financial responsibility of brokers and dealers engaging in securities
trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15(c)3-1.
218. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 347 (1969).
219. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
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the over-regulation, the political pressures and the potential for ven-
ality. We believe each of these evils is substantially greater in our
disordered system of land use regulation. What our present land use
regulation system does not provide, however, is public scrutiny over
speculative profits derived from monopoly benefits arising from public
expenditures; nor does our system have an effective method for per-
mitting socially desirable discrimination; nor any way to protect what
is regarded as a socially desirable investment; nor a method to compel
a sharing of the costs of subsidized but socially desirable growth.
We hardly need document the failure of the American system of
land use planning and controls to assure that all people have the op-
portunity to obtain a decent place to live according to their needs and
capabilities. That goal requires that a limited supply of land, little of
which remains within a reasonable distance from existing jobs, be
developed in a manner which takes into account not only the profit
motive of the developer, but overall social needs as well. By any mea-
sure, land is a commodity that justifies as much if not a greater degree
of public scrutiny and accountability by those private interests prof-
iting from public favors, as does telephone service, the sale of liquor,
or wharfingering. The courts and legislatures have not hesitated to
extend public regulation to these latter items and many others. If we
are serious about reform in land use policy, the time has come to re-
place old rhetoric and exotic proposals with some ideas that have been
around for centuries in respect to public regulation of transactions in
other commodities far less affected with the public interest than is the
case with land.
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